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Abstract
The NIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge is a competition to facilitate mea-
surable progress towards robust machine vision models and more generally appli-
cable adversarial attacks. This document is an updated version of our competition
proposal that was accepted in the competition track of 32nd Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2018).
1 Overview of the competition
This challenge is designed to facilitate measurable progress towards robust machine vision models
and more generally applicable adversarial attacks.
Modern machine vision algorithms are extremely susceptible to small and almost imperceptible per-
turbations of their inputs (so-called adversarial examples) [2, 18, 7, 14]. This property reveals an
astonishing difference in the information processing of humans and machines and raises security
concerns for many deployed machine vision systems like autonomous cars. Improving the robust-
ness of vision algorithms is thus important to close the gap between human and machine perception
and to enable safety-critical applications.
In a robust network no attack should be able to find imperceptible adversarial perturbations. We
thus propose to facilitate an open competition between neural networks and a large variety of strong
attacks, including ones that did not exist at the time when the networks have been proposed. To
this end the competition has one track for robust vision models as well as one track for targeted and
one for untargeted adversarial attacks. Submitted models and attacks are continuously pitted against
each other on an image classification task. Attacks are able to observe the decision of models
on a restricted number of self-defined inputs in order to craft model-specific minimal adversarial
examples.
1.1 Keywords
Robustness, adversarial attacks, adversarial examples, machine learning security
1.2 Novelty
We are aware of two related competitions, both of which were co-organised by authors of this pro-
posal:
1. NIPS 2017 Competition on adversarial attacks and defenses.
Co-organised by Alexey Kurakin.
This competition pitted models against attacks but only indirectly: attacks were unable to
query the models and hence had to device generic adversarial examples that would work
against as many models as possible. Devising defenses against such unspecific transfer-
based attacks is much simpler than becoming robust against model-specific attacks.
Competition Track of the 32nd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2018).
2. Robust Vision Benchmark (RVB).
Organised by Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber and Matthias Bethge.
The RVB is a continuously running benchmark (started in August 2017) in which submitted
models are evaluated against a wide number of attacks (including submitted ones). Attacks
are able to query the model both for confidence scores as well as gradients. This setting is
interesting in order to evaluate model robustness but does not represent a realistic security
scenario.
This proposal can be seen as a follow-up to last year’s NIPS competition but with a new concept
to facilitate a direct co-evolution of robust vision models and more generally applicable adversarial
attacks. By drawing lessons learnt from our previous competitions, we believe that this concept
enables much better benchmarking of robustness and the results should be interesting both for com-
puter vision and for the security of deployed machine learning systems.
2 Competition description
2.1 Background and impact
One of the most striking differences between human and machine perception is the susceptibility
of modern machine vision algorithms to extremely small and almost imperceptible perturbations of
their inputs [2, 18, 7, 14]. A tiny bit of carefully chosen image noise is usually sufficient to derail
object detection with neural networks (e.g. flip the prediction from dog to banana). Such pertur-
bations are commonly denoted as adversarial and algorithms to find them are called adversarial
attacks. Adversarial perturbations reveal that decision making in current deep neural networks is
based on correlational rather than causal features. From a security perspective they are worrisome
because they open avenues to manipulate sensory signals in ways that go unnoticed for humans but
seriously affect machine decisions.
So far, existing attacks (see [3, 15] for a taxonomy) had only limited success to threaten real-world
applications like autonomous cars which do not convey internal model information like gradients
or confidence values to an attacker. Even current transfer-based attacks can be effectively defended
against through ensemble adversarial training, as was demonstrated in the NIPS 2017 competition.
In addition, even if internal model information is available most existing attacks are easily disarmed
through simple means like gradient masking or intrinsic noise. An important goal of this competition
is to foster the development of stronger and more query-efficient attacks that do not rely on any
internal model information but only on the final decision [21, 3]. These so-called decision-based
attacks have only recently been described for vision models [21, 3] but are highly relevant in real-
world scenarios and much harder to defend than transfer-based or gradient-based attacks.
Adversarial examples highlight that neural networks do not rely on the same causal features that
humans use in visual perception. Closing this gap is important for many reasons: it would en-
able safety-critical applications of neural networks, would make neural networks more interpretable,
would provide us with a deeper understanding of the human visual system and would increase the
transferability of feature learning. Despite these advantages and many publications we are not aware
of any significant progress towards more robust neural networks in complex visual tasks like object
recognition, see also [4, 1]. A core problem is the proper evaluation of model robustness: a model
might just be perceived to be robust because the attacks deployed against it fail. However, most
attacks fail due to trivial side effects like gradient masking. Thus, just like in cryptography, the real
test of model robustness is how well it stands against the scrutiny of attacks that are specifically
designed against it. For this reason the competition is set up as a two-player game in which models
and attacks are continuously pitted against each other. This encourages a co-evolution in which at-
tacks can progressively adapt to the defense strategies of the models, and in which the models can
progressively learn to better defend against strong attacks. Attacks will be able to query individual
models, thereby enabling them to craft model-specific adversarials.
This competition seeks to stimulate progress towards more robust vision models as well as stronger
and more generally applicable adversarial attacks. We believe that more robust models will require
significant shifts in the type of representations that DNNs learn and the way they extract those
features from their inputs. The results of this competition thus have the potential to impact many
areas of machine learning. At the same time, stronger decision-based attacks will make it easier to
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evaluate the robustness of applied machine learning models and to assess under what circumstances
these models fail.
In last year’s NIPS competition 107 teams (187 people) participated in the defense track, 91 teams
(153 people) in the non-targeted attack track and 65 teams (107 people) in the targeted attack track.
Furthermore, the interest in adversarial robustness by the machine learning community has sharply
risen throughout the last years: according to Google scholar the number of papers on adversarial
examples increased from 11 in 2014 to 64 (2015) to 167 (2016) to 612 (2017), which represents
an 55-fold increase within four years. During the same period the number of publications on deep
neural networks increased only nine-fold (again according to Google scholar). In ICLR 2018 alone
more than 40 papers were submitted that directly dealt with adversarial examples and defenses and
another 55 papers mentioned them. It is thus safe to assume that this year’s competition would
gather even more participants than last year.
2.2 Data
While adversarial examples exist in many domains we here focus on vision or more specifically on
the popular task of object recognition in natural images. To this end we rely on TINY IMAGENET.
This data set is derived from the full ImageNet ILSVRC data set and has 100,000 images with size
64 x 64 pixels categorized into one of 200 classes. TINY IMAGENET is freely available and we will
provide wrappers for TensorFlow and PyTorch to simplify access to the data. We expect models to
be trained on TINY IMAGENET and we will provide several pre-trained baseline models. For testing
and development we collect images ourself.
We split the collected images into 500 development images and 4,500 test images. The 500 devel-
opment images will be released to participants to help during the development process. The test
images are further split into 8 × 500 images for the intermediate evaluation of the methods and a
hold-out set of 500 images for the final evaluation at the end of the competition. All images from
the test set will be kept secret until after the end of the competition.
2.3 Tasks and application scenarios
The competition will include three tasks:
1. Generate minimum untargeted adversarial examples. In this task participants are given
a sample image and access to a model. The goal is to create an adversarial image that is as
similar as possible to the sample image (in terms of L2 distance) but is wrongly classified
by the given model.
Application domain: This scenario corresponds to confusing a deployed machine learning
model by preventing it from correctly identifying an object (e.g. not recognizing a STOP
sign). In addition, the attack strategies will give us insights into how neural networks
perceive the world and classify inputs.
2. Generate minimum targeted adversarial examples. In this task participants are given
a sample image, a target class and access to a model. The goal is to create an adversarial
image that is as similar as possible to the sample image (in terms of L2 distance) but
classified as the target class by the given model.
Application domain: Same as above but with increased safety concerns (e.g. detecting a
$10 cheque as a $1,000,000 cheque).
3. Increase size of minimum adversarial examples. In this task participants design robust
object recognition models. For each given sample each adversarial attack proposes a min-
imum adversarial example for the given model. To goal of this task is to increase the size
of the minimum adversarial perturbations (the L2 distance between the best adversarial ex-
ample and the sample image) the attacks can find.
Application domain: any safety-critical vision application for which we need to ensure
reliable visual inference.
Participants can submit solutions to all three tasks. All submissions are continuously pitted against
each other on a fixed set of samples to encourage a co-evolution of robust models and better adver-
sarial attacks.
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2.4 Metrics
Participants can submit robust models as well as adversarial attacks. Models and attacks are pitted
against each other on a number of image samples. Intuitively, we want the model score to represent
the expected size of the minimum adversarial perturbations (larger is better). Conversely, the attack
score should represent the expected size of the adversarial perturbations it can generate (smaller is
better).
To be more precise we denote the set of submitted models asM , the set of attacks asA (both targeted
and untargeted) and the set of samples as S. The top-5 models and attacks are denoted as M5 and
A5 respectively. We further denote an adversarial image sˆ for a given sample s ∈ S generated by
attack a ∈ A against modelm ∈ M as sˆa(s,m). As a distance metric between to images s1 and s2
we use the L2 distance,
d(s1, s2) = ‖s1 − s2‖2 . (1)
Model score. For each model m and each sample s we compute the adversarial sˆa(s,m) for the
attacks a ∈ A5. We then determine the size of the smallest adversarial perturbation,
dminm (s, A5) = min
a∈A5
d(s, sˆa(s,m)). (2)
If for a given sample s no attack was able to generate an adversarial example we set dminm (s) to a
conservative upper bound. Finally, the model score is calculated as the median across the minimum
distances,
ModelScorem = median(
{
dminm (s, A5)|s ∈ S
}
). (3)
Attack score. We run each attack a against the top-5 models m ∈ M5 and each sample s ∈ S.
For each model and sample we compute the distance
da(s,m) = d(s, sˆa(s,m)). (4)
If the attack fails to generate an adversarial we set the corresponding distance to a conservative upper
bound da(s,m). The final attack score is then the median size of the adversarial perturbation,
AttackScorea = median({da(s,m)|s ∈ S,m ∈ M5}) (5)
The median is important to make the evaluation robust against outliers. For attacks lower scores are
better, for models higher scores are better.
Both scores depend on the set of top-5 models and attacks. This focuses attacks on the hardest
models and makes the evaluation feasible but also introduces a recursive dependence between (a)
evaluating model/attack scores and (b) determining the top-5 in each track. This does not affect the
final evaluation in which we pit all models against all attacks, which allows us to reliably determine
the top-5 model and attack submissions (see 3.1.4). During the rest of the competition we determine
the top-5 models & attacks every two weeks (in the same way we perform the final evaluation) and
all submissions will be tested against them until the next evaluation round.
2.5 Baselines and code available
Model baselines. We will provide three baselines, all of which are based on the ResNet-50 model:
(1) a vanilla model, (2) an adversarially trained model, and (3) a vanilla model with intrinsic frozen
noise. We will provide the pretrained weights for all models.
Untargeted attack baselines. We will provide five baselines: (1) a simple attack using additive
Gaussian noise, (2) a simple attack using salt and pepper noise, (3) the Boundary Attack [3] with
reduced number of iterations, (4) a single-step transfer attack and (5) an iterative transfer attack.
Targeted attack baselines. Wewill provide four baselines: (1) a simple interpolation-based attack,
(2) the Pointwise attack [16], (3) the Boundary attack [3] and (4) an iterative transfer attack.
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2.6 Tutorial and documentation
We will release an extensive development package containing test images, tutorials, example sub-
missions and evaluation scripts:
• Example model submission with placeholder for user-defined models (framework agnostic)
and a tutorial on how to use it.
• Example attack submission with placeholder for user-defined adversarial attacks (frame-
work agnostic) and a tutorial on how to use it.
• Code of all baseline attacks, including a detailed description.
• Code and model weights of all baseline models, including a detailed description.
• Set of 500 test images which participants can use for development of their models and
attacks.
• Tool to evaluate model and attack submissions before the actual submissions. In this way
users can test their code and its runtime behaviour before the actual submission.
• A reading list summarizing publications relevant for this competition.1
Some of the above mentioned code and tutorials will be reused and adapted from the NIPS 2017
competition, from the Robust Vision Benchmark as well as from previous competitions run by crow-
dAI.
3 Organizational aspects
3.1 Protocol
The competition will be hosted on crowdAI (https://crowdai.org). Participants submit their models
and attacks as Docker images (see section 3.1.1). Submissions are continuously evaluated through-
out the competition (see section 3.1.2). The top-5 models and attacks against which submissions are
tested will be determined every two weeks (see section 3.1.3), at which point all submissions are
re-evaluated and the leaderboard is updated accordingly.
At the end of the competition we perform a final evaluation to determine the winners in each track
(see section 3.1.4). The models and attacks are run in an isolated Kubernetes environmentwith local
subnetworks that restrict intercommunication to the exchange between a single model and a single
attack to prevent cheating. The communication is further restricted via a very limited HTTP API
interface. To prevent models from memorising the correct labels and clean images (e.g. to perform
a nearest-neighbour over the clean images), we test that models return decisions in a sequence-
independent manner (i.e. model decisions should not depend on past inputs).
Before the official start of the competition we will simulate a full competition, including virtual
participants and submissions, to test all parts of the system.
3.1.1 Submission process
Given the nature of the challenge participants are expected to package their models as docker images.
Submissions are allowed in two ways: either as simple Docker image dumps or as code repositories.
Docker image dumps. Participants build Docker images along given specifications (which we
publish alongside some simple examples in the development package) and submit the final image to
our servers. This option is most suitable for experienced users and guarantees maximum flexibility.
Code repositories. To decrease the entrance barriers for participants not as comfortable with
the Docker ecosystem, we allow simple code submissions based on Binder (https://mybinder.org/).
Binder allows users to distill the software environment of their code as a set of configuration files in
their source code from which we can deterministically generate a Docker image using repo2docker.
In the development package we will provide a series of template submission repositories which are
1
https://medium.com/@wielandbr/reading-list-for-the-nips-2018-adversarial-vision-challenge-63cbac345b2f
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already pre-configured with popular libraries of choice like Tensorflow. Participants can use the
binder tools to locally test their code before making the submissions. The code repositories will be
hosted on a custom gitlab instance on crowdAI.
By having submissions as repositories we will also ensure high reproducibility in the cumulative
results of the challenge. At the end of the challenge the repositories will be made publicly accessible
with the participant’s open source license of choice (among those licenses referenced by the Open
Source Initiative).
3.1.2 Continuous evaluation
Participants can submit their models or attacks at any point in time. The number of submissions
is limited to at most one submission per track within 24 hours. The submitted Docker images are
evaluated in the backend against the top-5 opponents (either models or attacks depending on track)
on 200 validation samples to determine the score for that submission.
3.1.3 Top-5 evaluation round
Every four weeks we perform a more extensive evaluations of all submissions (for each team the
newest submission counts) to determine the new top-5 models and attacks. We use a test set of 200
secret sample images which are different in each evaluation round. The evaluation is performed
according the following protocol:
• The submission system is frozen for 48 hours during which the evaluation is performed.
• Round 1: All model/attack combinations are evaluated on a small set of 10 samples. From
this evaluation we determine a very rough estimate of model and attack scores. Only the
best 50% are considered for the next round.
• Round 2: The remaining model/attack combinations are evaluated in the same way as
in Round 1 but on a larger set of 20 samples. Again we determine the top 50% of the
remaining submissions.
• We iterate these rounds until we end up with the top-10 models and attacks. For these
submissions we evaluate all model/attack combinations on the full test set of 200 samples
to rigorously determine the top-5 submissions in each track.
• Scoring round: All submissions are re-scored on the 200 validation images and the leader-
boards are updated accordingly.
3.1.4 Final evaluation round
To be scored in the final evaluation round participants have to release their code as open source.
The scoring is performed in the same way as in the Top-5 evaluation rounds but this time the final
scoring is performed on 500 secret test images. These test images have not been used in any of the
evaluation rounds before.
3.2 Rules
• Bethgelab and Google Brain employees can participate but are ineligible for prices.
• To be eligible for the final scoring, participants are required to release the code of their
submissions as open source.
• Any legitimate input that is not classified by a model (e.g. for which an error is produced)
will be counted as an adversarial.
• If an attack fails to produce an adversarial (e.g. because it produces an error), then we will
register a worst-case adversarial instead (a uniform grey image).
• Each classifier must be stateless and act one image at a time. This rule is supposed to
prevent strategies such as memorizing pre-attack images and classifying replayed versions
of them at defense time.
• The decision of each classifier must be deterministic. In other words, the classifier decision
must be the same for the same input at any point in time.
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• Attacks are allowed to query the model on self-defined inputs up to 1,000 times / sample.
This limit is strictly enforced in the model/attack interface and an error will be returned
whenever the attack queries the model more often.
• Each model has to process one image within 40ms on a K80 GPU (excluding initialization
and setup which may take up to 100s).
• Each attack has to process a batch of 10 images within 900s on a K80 GPU (excluding
initialization and setup which may take up to 100s).
3.3 Schedule
Proposed schedule for the competition:
• April 20, 2018. Launch website with announcement and competition rules. Start active
advertisement of the competition.
• June 18, 2018. Release development kit for participants.
• July 2 - November 1, 2018. Competition is running. At the beginning, baselines will
serve as top-5 models and attacks. Submissions are continously evaluated, the top-5 are
determined every two weeks.
• November 1, 2018 Deadline for the final submission.
• November 1 - 15, 2018 Organizers evaluate submissions.
• November 15, 2018 Announce competition results and release evaluation set of images.
3.4 Competition promotion
The competition will be promoted via the organisers’ Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and Reddit ac-
counts as well as the CleverHans blog, the crowdAI email list and several university mailing lists.
Ian Goodfellow has also agreed to promote the challenge via his social media channels. Finally, we
are currently in contact with Nvidia and Intel to secure prices for the top teams in each track.
3.5 Organizing team
The proposed competition is technically challenging to run. It requires a complex orchestration
to evaluate all submissions on tens of cloud GPU instances simultaneously throughout the whole
competition. It requires extensive tooling to reduce the entrance barrier to participants as much as
possible. And it requires much attention to the community and the platform to detect and resolve
problems quickly. We have assembled a diverse team with recognised experts in the field of ad-
versarial robustness to design, administrate and promote the competition as well as software and
orchestration experts to design, implement and run the backend. Most members of the team have
extensive experience with running large-scale machine learning competitions.
Roles
Wieland Brendel is a senior postdoctoral researcher in
the lab of Matthias Bethge at the University of Tübin-
gen, Germany. He is co-organizer of the Robust Vision
Benchmark, co-author of the Foolbox [16] (which provides
framework-agnostic implementations of many adversarial
attacks) and was the first to develop an effective decision-
based attack at ImageNet scale (the Boundary attack [3]).
• Lead coordinator
• Competition design
• Platform administrator
• Oversees evaluation
• Beta tester
• Advertisement
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Jonas Rauber is a PhD student under the supervision of
Matthias Bethge. Together with Wieland he co-organised
the Robust Vision Benchmark, developed the Foolbox [16]
as well as the Boundary Attack [3] and worked on the noise-
robustness of deep neural networks [6].
• Platform administrator
• Community support
• Baseline method provider
• Preparation of dev package
• Beta tester
Alexey Kurakin is a senior research software engineer at
Google Brain. Alexey was the lead organiser in last year’s
NIPS competition. In his research work he demonstrated
that adversarial examples can exist in the physical world
[10] and was the first to develop adversarial training at Ima-
geNet scale [11].
• Data provider (test images)
• Baseline method provider
• Advise on challenge design
Nicolas Papernot is a PhD student in the lab of Patrick
McDaniel and an intern at Google Brain. He is a developer
and maintainer of the CleverHans security library [13], pro-
posed the first practical decision-based attack for deep neu-
ral networks [15] and has published several other works on
attacks and defenses.
• Advertisement
• Advise on challenge design
Marcel Salathé is a digital epidemiologist working at the
interface of population biology, computational sciences, and
the social sciences. In the summer of 2015, Marcel be-
came an Associate Professor at EPFL where he heads the
Digital Epidemiology Lab. He is the co-founder of crow-
dAI (https://crowdai.org), a platform for organizing ma-
chine learning challenges and for encouraging reproducible
research in Artificial Intelligence.
• Advise on submission and
evaluation backend
• Advertisement
• Advise on challenge design
Sharada Prasanna Mohanty is a PhD student in the lab-
oratory of Prof. Marcel Salathé at École Polytechnique
Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland. His research is on
exploiting numerous aspects of Machine Learning to help
solve real world problems in Biology. He is co-founder
of crowdAI (https://crowdai.org) and co-organized the NIPS
2017 Learning to Run Challenge. He will help design and
implement the submissions and evaluation backend, and
help shape the outline and rules of the competition.
• Design & implement submis-
sion and evaluation backend
• Advise on challenge design
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Behar Veliqi is a senior research software engineer in
the lab of Matthias. Behar holds a B.Sc. in Computer
Science and has worked as a software engineer at United
Internet and IBM for several years. He has extensive
experience in scaling machine learning experiments on
high-performance cluster environments and has extensively
worked with databases and cluster management tools.
• Platform administrator
• Community support
• Preparation of dev package
• Design & implement submis-
sion and evaluation backend
• Evaluator
Matthias Bethge is professor at the University of Tübin-
gen since 2009 and has served as area chair at several con-
ferences including NIPS. Matthias has a strong track record
on model comparison and benchmarking both w.r.t. unsu-
pervised representation learning (e.g. [20, 17]), and w.r.t.
neural and behavioral models (e.g. [19, 8, 9, 12]). Since
2010 Matthias Bethge has been the director of the Bern-
stein center and since 2016 vice chair of the national Bern-
stein network. He has also served as general chair of the
annual Bernstein meeting and is the head of the newly es-
tablished Tuebingen AI Center (http://tue.ai). He is inventor
of neural style transfer [5] and co-founder of DeepArt UG
(http://deepart.io) and Layer7 AI (http://layer7.ai).
• Supervisor of strategic
concept
• Advise on all issues related
to the challenge
4 Resources
4.1 Existing resources, including prizes
Amazon AWS will sponsor the necessary cloud computing resources to evaluate submissions
($65,000 worth of cloud compute resources, see letter of support). Additional in-house GPU ca-
pacities as well as access to the SwissDataScienceCenter (https://datascience.ch/) are available to
evaluate submissions.
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